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 Abstract 
 
In this paper I critically assess Christine Korsgaard’s work on the nature of normativity. 
Specifically, I focus on Korsgaard’s attempt to ground normativity in the constitutive standards 
of action and agency. In the first section, I consider David Enoch’s criticism of constitutivism in 
general and I acknowledge that his criticism works against constitutivists who focus on the 
constitutive features of objects, entities, or practices. But I argue that Korsgaard can avoid 
Enoch’s criticism because she focuses instead on the constitutive features of the solution to a 
problem we already find ourselves facing: the problem of what to do and who to be. Korsgaard 
believes that, in order to solve this problem, we must value humanity. So, solving the problem 
requires that we respect the moral law. In the second section, I argue that, since the normative 
problem as presented by Korsgaard is either impossible to solve or has a trivial solution, we 
should reject Korsgaard’s formulation of the normative problem. Finally, in the third section, I 
suggest that, though Korsgaard is right to say that we face normative problems and that this is the 
source of normativity, her formulation of the normative problem fails because she does not 
adequately consider the conditions under which we face normative problems. And I argue that, if 
we consider these conditions, we will realize that we encounter normative problems only when 
we find ourselves confronted by competing claims where solving the normative problem requires 
balancing these claims against one another.  
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This MRP will engage with Christine Korsgaard’s work on the nature of normativity.  In 
the first section of my paper, I defend Korsgaard’s constitutivism against a standard critique of 
constitutivist projects.  Korsgaard has been interpreted as arguing that we are essentially agents 
and so are subject to the constitutive standards of agency.  One way of criticizing this argument 
is to say that the constitutive standards of agency are normative for us only if the category 
‘agent’ is normative for us, and Korsgaard never tells us why we should be agents (at most, she 
shows us that we already are agents, and that is not quite the same thing).  But I will argue that 
this criticism misses the point of Korsgaard’s argument.  I do not take Korsgaard to be arguing 
that we are some kind of entity ‘agent’, and so must be good agents.  Instead, I take her to be 
arguing that we are confronted with a normative problem: unlike ‘lower’ animals, we cannot 
simply take our desires/inclination as authoritative.  We are not constrained by instinct and thus 
we face the questions: ‘what should I do?’ and ‘who should I be?’.  Korsgaard thinks that the 
solution to this problem is agency (or reflective action) where there are certain constitutive 
norms of agency.  Specifically, she argues that it is only as human (reflective) beings that we 
face the normative problem and must commit to agency.  Therefore, agency requires that we 
respect our humanity (I am drawing a distinction here between the ‘human (reflective) being’ as 
the one who is confronted with the normative problem and the ‘agent’ as the one who solves the 
problem where ‘agency’ is the solution to the problem).1  In other words, agency requires action 
in accordance with the moral law.   
In the second section, however, I will argue that this last part of Korsgaard’s argument 
fails.  I will argue that the normative problem, as presented by Korsgaard, is either (a) impossible 
Gilbert-Walsh 2 
 
to solve or (b) has a trivial solution.  If (a), then the moral law is tantamount to: ‘everything is 
forbidden’.  This would mean that, since there is no such thing as action in accordance with the 
moral law, agency is impossible.  This is implausible.  But if (b), then the moral law is 
tantamount to: ‘everything is permitted’ (except perhaps certain forms of self-deceit – see note 
66).  This means that, since essentially all action is consistent with the moral law, agency is all 
too easy.  Moreover, if the problem is trivial and essentially everything is permitted, then it is no 
longer a real problem.  Either way, Korsgaard’s account of the normative problem fails.  If we 
are to remain constitutivists, we need a new account of the normative problem.   
In the third section, I will argue that the reason Korsgaard’s initial framing of the 
normative problem is inaccurate is because she does not sufficiently consider the conditions 
under which we face the normative problem.  We do not usually face the normative problem in 
our day to day lives.  For the most part, we do take our desires and inclinations to be 
authoritative.  We are mostly constrained by instinct and custom.2  I will then suggest that we 
face the normative problem only when our desires and/or practical identities conflict with one 
another.  And, under these conditions, the problem we face is one of responding to competing 
claims.  There are certain standards a solution to this problem must meet in order to count as a 
viable solution.  A response that fails to satisfy any of the competing claims would fail as a 
response; a response that satisfies the more important claim(s) would be better; and a response 
that satisfies all of the claims is best.  But there is no reason to believe that the solution must 





Section One: Constitutive Standards of Action and Agency 
 
Constitutivist theories of normativity might seem to promise a resolution to the is-ought 
divide.  After all, constitutive standards are at once normative and descriptive.  Korsgaard 
explains that constitutive standards “are descriptive because an object must meet them, or at least 
aspire to meet them, in order to be what it is.  And they are normative because an object to which 
they apply can fail to meet them, at least to some extent.”3  Several common examples of 
constitutive standards include: a good house provides shelter, a good knife is sharp, and a good 
chair supports a person’s weight.  There is a sense in which a house with a leaky roof is less of a 
house, a dull knife is less of a knife, and a wobbly chair is less of a chair.  In fact, if the roof 
becomes leaky enough, we might be tempted to say it is no longer a house, but a ruin.  Likewise, 
a sufficiently dull knife might be said to be little more than a piece of metal and a sufficiently 
unstable chair might be said to be no more than a collection of wood.  So, when you call 
something a house, a knife, or a chair, you are implying that it should keep out the rain, have a 
sharp edge, or support your weight.  Of course, if we are interested in providing a foundation for 
normativity more broadly, pointing to the constitutive standards of houses, knives, and chairs 
won’t get us very far.  We can still always ask whether or not it is good that the knife is a good 
knife.  If the knife is in the hands of an assassin, maybe we would prefer that the knife be a little 
less sharp.4  But what if we could uncover constitutivist standards to being an agent?  We are all 
agents, so perhaps the constitutive standards of agency can serve as the ultimate source of 
normativity. 
Of course, there are good reasons to be suspicious of constitutivist theories which attempt 
to ground normativity in constitutive standards of agency.  In this section I will begin by 
Gilbert-Walsh 4 
 
considering David Enoch’s criticism of such projects.  But I will argue that Enoch 
misunderstands Korsgaard’s position and thus his criticism of constitutivism in general does not 
apply to Korsgaard’s work.  By focusing on how Enoch gets Korsgaard wrong, I hope to show 
that Korsgaard does not begin, and cannot begin, by simply claiming that we are agents.  Instead, 
she begins by claiming that we face a normative problem.     
Much of Korsgaard’s work is devoted to showing that we must see ourselves as reflective 
beings and so we are subject to the constitutive standards of agency.5  One way of reading her 
argument is: (1) we are reflective beings (agents) who act for reasons,6 and (2) there are 
constitutive standards of agency and action, therefore (3) we are subject to those standards of 
agency and action.  Certainly, this is how Enoch reads Korsgaard’s argument.7  And Enoch 
claims this argument fails because it still leaves us with the question: why should we be agents?  
He says that, even if Korsgaard can demonstrate that there are constitutive standards of agency, 
unless she can show us that we have a reason to be agents, she cannot show us that we have a 
reason to be good agents.   
Of course, Korsgaard could respond to Enoch’s objection by insisting that agency is not a 
choice: we are already agents and so are always subject to the constitutive standards of agency.  
In fact, in Self-Constitution, Korsgaard says that “human beings are condemned to choice and 
action”8 and that agency is our “plight: the simple and inexorable fact of the human condition.”9  
So perhaps Korsgaard would be tempted by the claim that, since we already are agents, we 
should be good agents.  But, as Enoch points out, even if I must be an agent (where this is a 
descriptive claim), it does not follow that I must be a good agent (where this is a prescriptive 
claim).10  To illustrate this point, Enoch tells us to imagine that we find ourselves playing chess 
and, for some reason, we cannot quit.11  Granted, we must play chess, but must we play chess 
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well?  Enoch says no, in order to have a reason to play chess well, we would need a reason to 
play chess.  The fact that we must12 play chess does not give us a reason to play chess, and so 
cannot give us a reason to play chess well.13  Similarly, the fact that we must14 be agents does not 
give us a reason to be agents, and so cannot give us a reason to be good agents.  Enoch reminds 
us that natural necessity is not equivalent to normative necessity.15  Thus, even if we must be 
agents, we can still ask: ‘why should I strive to be a good agent?’.16  In short, Enoch thinks that 
Korsgaard is guilty of some version of the is-ought fallacy.   
I would argue, however, that Enoch misreads Korsgaard on this point.  Korsgaard does 
not begin her argument by insisting that we are agents.  She does not commit the is-ought 
fallacy.  Instead, she begins by arguing that, unlike lower animals, human (reflective) beings face 
a normative problem.  “[A lower animal’s] desires are its will,” but we can call our desires into 
question and ask: “is this desire really a reason to act?”17  Thus, unlike lower animals, we face 
the question: ‘what do I have a reason to do?’.  It is important to keep in mind that, for 
Korsgaard, normative concepts do not refer to objects out there in the world.  Instead, she argues 
that “normative concepts like right, good, obligation, reason, are our names for the solutions to 
normative problems.”18  And she maintains that this is the source of the ‘force’ of normativity.    
“If you recognize the problem to be yours, and the solution to be the best one, then the solution is 
binding upon you.”19  So, when Korsgaard refers to the constitutive standards of agency and 
action, she is not referring to the constitutive standards of a certain kind of entity or behaviour.  
Enoch is right to reject that kind of constitutivism.  Instead, she is referring to constitutive 
standards of a solution to a problem we all already find ourselves facing.20   
For Korsgaard, a human being is an animal that faces the problem of reflection and finds 
itself asking: ‘what do I have a reason to do?’.  And since we need a solution to this problem, we 
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must take the constitutive standards of such a solution seriously.21  Specifically, Korsgaard 
believes that any answer to the reflective being’s problem, in order to count as an answer to the 
reflective being’s problem, must take the form: ‘I have a reason to do x (act) for the sake of y 
(purpose)’.  Moreover, she thinks that we can have a reason to do x for the sake of y only if we 
can will that ‘doing x for the sake of y’ (the maxim) become a universal law.22  Korsgaard 
therefore insists that any solution to the normative problem must have the form of a categorical 
imperative.23  In other words, rational action is the solution to a normative problem we face, and 
this is why we have a reason to be agents and so to commit to the constitutive norms of agency.24 
Of course, the idea that action requires willing our maxim as a universal law is 
controversial.  But Korsgaard believes that we can show that this claim is true if we consider the 
nature of the normative problem.  If we must act for reasons and cannot simply act on our desires 
like other animals can, then we need a way of determining whether a desire can serve as a reason 
for acting.  We need a standard against which to test our desires.  And, for this standard to work, 
it must be a sufficient standard, i.e., one that is, at least in some respect, immune to further 
questioning.25  But Korsgaard argues that the categorical imperative: “act only on a maxim 
which [you] could will to be a law” is the only standard that we cannot question.  “Its only 
constraint on our choice is that it has the form of a law.  And nothing determines what the law 
must be.  All that it has to be is a law.”26  In other words, the categorical imperative is nothing 
more than that form of a law or standard against which to test our desires.  So, once we accept 
that we need some standard, we have already accepted the categorical imperative.  Thus, we 
cannot coherently ask for some further standard against which to test the categorical imperative. 
Korsgaard acknowledges, however, that this does not do much to restrict the content of 
our solutions to the normative problem.  The categorical imperative, as described by Korsgaard, 
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is little more than an empty formalism.  And she recognizes this, and so acknowledges that the 
categorical imperative is not enough to get us to any truly determinate moral law.27   For 
Korsgaard, the categorical imperative requires that you “act only according to that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”28  But she does not 
think that this is equivalent to the imperative: “so act that you use humanity, in your own person 
as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a 
means.”29  This is because Korsgaard does not assume that, when I will my maxim as a universal 
law, I must will it as a universal law for all persons.  The question remains: ‘what is the domain 
of the universal law?’30  Certainly, I must be legislating for myself, but who else am I legislating 
for?  According to Korsgaard, the answer depends on how I see myself, or my practical identity.  
If I see myself as essentially an Athenian, then I must see myself as legislating for all Athenians 
and the relevant question would be: ‘what can an Athenian have a reason to do?’  If I believe 
that, as an Athenian, I must not betray Athens to Sparta for money, then I must believe that, as 
an Athenian, you must not betray Athens to Sparta for money.  Likewise, if I see myself as 
essentially a Christian, then I must see myself as legislating for all Christians and the relevant 
question would be: ‘what can a Christian have a reason to do?’  And if I see myself as essentially 
a human (reflective) being, then the relevant question would be: ‘what can a human being have a 
reason to do?’ 
Thus, Korsgaard believes that our practical identities determine the domain of the law we 
give to ourselves, and she says that “[our] reasons express [our] identity …; [our] obligations 
spring from what that identity forbids.”31   But this seems to leave us with relativism.  We all 
have many different practical identities and so we all have different reasons and obligations.  We 
Gilbert-Walsh 8 
 
all live under different laws.  The answer to the question: ‘is this desire really a reason [for me] 
to act?’ depends on who I am.   
Korsgaard thinks that she can avoid this relativism because there is another normative 
question: ‘what do I have a reason to be?’  As human (reflective) beings, we can always step 
back from our desires and call them into question.  But as human (reflective) beings, we can also 
always step back from our particular practical identities and call them into question.32  There is, 
however, one practical identity from which we cannot step back.  We cannot step back from the 
practical identity of human (reflective) being.  This is because it is only as reflective beings that 
we are confronted with normative questions in the first place.  To question our identity as 
reflective beings is to question our identity as the kind of beings that can question their own 
identity.  I take it that this is what Korsgaard means when she says that we need particular 
practical identities, but that this need itself comes from our identity as “a human being, a 
reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live.”33  Thus, we are essentially human 
(reflective) beings and the relevant question is always: ‘what can a human being have a reason to 
do?’  It is not simply because we are some kind of entity ‘agent’ that we are subject to the 
constitutive standards of agency.  Instead, we are reflective beings, to be a reflective being is to 
be confronted34 with a normative problem, and agency is the solution to this normative problem.  
Moreover, in order to count as a solution to our problem, our solution must have the form of a 
law for all of humanity, a moral law.  Agency requires action in accordance with the moral law.  
But this then leaves us with the question: what is this ‘moral law’?  What reasons ‘express’ the 





Section Two: A Useless Standard 
 
2.1 – Everything is Forbidden 
 
 Before considering the nature of the ‘moral law’, however, we need to say more about the 
normative problem, what’s at stake in solving this problem, and how appealing to humanity is 
supposed to help us solve this problem.  Korsgaard insists that, as reflective beings, we are 
driven to seek “the unconditioned.”35  Practical reason introduces a normative regress because it 
forces us to question our contingent desires and practical identities, and to seek a stable 
foundation which will allow us to justify our actions.  But Korsgaard says that the only necessary 
identity which can provide such a foundation is our identity as human beings, and it is only as 
human beings that we have a reason to embrace our particular practical identities.  Moreover, our 
particular practical identities are the sources of our reasons for acting.  Thus, Korsgaard insists 
that, “if we do not treat our humanity as a normative identity, none of our other identities can be 
normative, and then we can have no reason to act at all.”36   If we want to avoid normative 
scepticism, we must treat our humanity as a practical, normative form of identity and value 
ourselves as human beings.37 
 Korsgaard says that we should understand this argument as a transcendental argument, 
according to which valuing our humanity is the transcendental condition of acting.  She claims 
that “rational action exists, so we know it is possible.”  But “rational action is possible only if 
human beings find their own humanity to be valuable.”38  Therefore, we must take ourselves to 
be valuable.  Unfortunately, even if we must accept our human identity as normative, it is not 
obvious how this is supposed to help us justify our other contingent identities which we can 
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question.  It is not clear that the second premise of Korsgaard’s argument works.  Perhaps she 
can show that we must value our humanity.  But how does this make rational action possible?  
Some of Korsgaard’s critics worry that, if her argument goes through, nothing is permitted.  
Samuel Kerstein, for example, argues that “an appeal to the notion of identity necessity is not 
sufficient to justify any particular practical identity”.39  In other words, Kerstein insists that an 
appeal to humanity cannot help us answer the question: ‘what do I have a reason to be?’   He 
points out that, according to Korsgaard, “your identity would withstand such scrutiny only if, 
after posing the question of your grounds for conforming to it, you reach ‘a satisfactory answer, 
one that admits of no further questioning.’”40  But I can always question my particular practical 
identities.  And pointing out that I need some practical identity in order to act does not help me 
decide which practical identity I should adopt.  Since I can still question each of my particular 
practical identities, it is not clear why I should take any of them to be normative.  If I do not take 
any of my particular practical identities to be normative, it is not clear how I can have a reason to 
act.  Thus, it is not clear how my valuing my humanity makes rational action possible. 
Of course, this shows only that endorsing our humanity is not sufficient to justify action.  
It may still be necessary for us to endorse our humanity in order to justify action.  So Korsgaard 
could still insist that the argument works.  But this then leads us to a problem with the first 
premise of the transcendental argument, that rational action exists.  If Korsgaard is right, and true 
action is unconditioned / fully reflective, then, on her own terms, we do not ever truly act.  We 
cannot appeal to the fact that we take ourselves to be acting in order to show that true rational 
action is possible.  The problem is that, in order to support the second premise of her argument 
(that we must value our humanity in order to act), Korsgaard argues that our humanity is the only 
identity which can end the normative regress.  And she argues that we cannot act until we solve 
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this regress and that we face this regress because we must always question our desires and 
particular practical identities.  But this means that we must value our humanity because we must 
always question our desires and particular practical identities.  However, it is not clear how a 
being who must always question its desires and particular practical identities could ever have a 
reason to do anything.  In other words, the very identity which is supposed to be a necessary 
condition for action would also seem to preclude acting.41 So, if Korsgaard’s transcendental 
argument is going to work as a solution to the normative regress, she needs to show that 
endorsing our humanity is a necessary and sufficient condition for acting.  She must show that 
we can appeal to our humanity (which we have now established is valuable) in order to justify 
acting on our desires and particular practical identities (which we have now called into question).   
 Korsgaard could respond that she is making a practical claim, not a theoretical claim.42  
She does not need to show that we truly act; all that the transcendental argument requires is that 
we take ourselves to be acting.  Korsgaard makes a similar argument with respect to the problem 
of the freedom of the will.  She acknowledges that determinism may threaten the possibility of 
action from the theoretical point of view.43  But she reminds us that the “Scientific World View 
… is not a substitute for human life.”44  From a practical point of view, we are capable of free 
action.  It might be tempting to make a similar claim here.  Thus, Korsgaard might substitute the 
premise: ‘rational action exists’ with the premise: ‘we necessarily take ourselves to engage in 
rational action’ and insist that this is enough for her argument to go through.  However, while 
determinism is a theoretical threat to the possibility of action, the normative regress is a practical 
threat to the possibility of action.  As Korsgaard presents it, the problem of reflection is a 
practical problem.45  The problem is not that we might never act according to a theoretical point 
of view, but that we might never truly act according to a practical point of view.   
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Our problem is a serious one, we need reasons to act.  But appealing to our humanity will 
not help us find any such reasons.  Korsgaard can show that we must value our humanity only if 
she also argues that we must call everything else into question.  But if our reasons express our 
identities it is not clear what a human being as such has a reason to do.  What reasons ‘express’ 
the human identity?  And if our obligations stem from what our identity forbids, and we are 
forbidden to act on our desires or particular practical identities, then we human beings are 
forbidden to act and obligated to do nothing.  The moral law, the law for all human beings is: 
‘everything is forbidden’.46 
 
2.2 – Is Anything Forbidden? 
 
 But perhaps Korsgaard can avoid these problems.  Korsgaard says that, as reflective 
beings, we must reflect until we find “a satisfactory answer,” we must seek “the 
unconditioned.”47  Kerstein48 seems to think that this means that we must be able to derive our 
particular practical identities from our identity as reflective beings if our particular practical 
identities are to be justified.  But he points out that no such derivation is possible.  And he argues 
that this means that no particular practical identity is justified and so no particular action can be 
justified.  Therefore, the normative problem cannot be solved.  However, when Korsgaard says 
we need “a satisfactory answer”, she is not arguing that we must be able to derive our particular 
practical identities from our human identity.  Instead, she means only that our particular practical 
identities must be consistent with our human identity.   I do not take her to be arguing that a 
reflective being must question, and so reject all of its contingent desires and practical identities.  
Rather, she believes that a reflective being must question, and so test all of its contingent desires 
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and practical identities.  The moral law can tell us only to rule out certain practical identities, it 
cannot tell us to adopt particular practical identities.49  Certainly, Korsgaard’s insistence that we 
need “a satisfactory answer” is misleading.  But, if my interpretation of Korsgaard’s 
constitutivism is correct (see section one, especially pages 5-8), it is best to read this as the claim 
that we need a solution with the correct form, a solution that can count as a solution to the 
normative problem.  And any maxim that is consistent with the moral law can serve as a solution 
to that problem.50   
 Korsgaard herself acknowledges that we need to endorse at least some of our inclinations 
if we are to act at all.51  And she denies that our reflective nature is opposed to our animal nature.  
She insists that “acting from reason is not opposed to acting from inclination; reason and 
inclination have different functional roles in action.  The faculty of inclination alerts us to 
incentives, or possible reasons, for action, while reason has the function of deciding whether to 
act as we are inclined to or not.”52  This is most likely why, in The Sources of Normativity, 
Korsgaard claims that we must value our animal nature if we are to value anything at all.53  A 
mere animal is incapable of action54 and a pure reflective being will never care to act.  It is only 
for reflective animals that action is possible. 
 As discussed in the previous section, many of Korsgaard’s critics55 worry that she depicts 
human beings as forced to reject their desires and their particular practical identities and this 
means that the human being, as presented by Korsgaard, can never justify action: nothing is 
permitted.  But I will argue that Korsgaard actually faces the opposite problem.  It is not clear 
what the moral law rules out.  It is not clear what is forbidden.  Korsgaard certainly thinks that 
some identities will fail the test of reflection.  For example, she claims that the practical identities 
of assassin or mafioso are clearly inconsistent with the moral law.56  After all, Korsgaard says 
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that we do not discover our practical identities through scientific inquiry or theoretical 
reasoning.57  Instead, they are best understood as descriptions “under which [we] value 
[ourselves], … under which [we] find [our] life to be worth living and [our] actions to be worth 
undertaking.”58  Moreover, Korsgaard thinks that the one practical identity we must all accept, 
the one identity which is not contingent, is the human identity.  This is why Korsgaard says that 
we must value humanity if we are to value anything at all.59   Unless we value humanity, we 
cannot act.60  And clearly the assassin and the mafioso do not show enough respect for the value 
of humanity. 
But is it so obvious that a human (reflective) being cannot will ‘killing for cash’ as a 
universal law for all human (reflective) beings, even if this means that they will always be in 
danger of being assassinated?  It might seem that no actual human being could will this, but that 
is only because we are not simply reflective beings.  It is not insofar as we are reflective beings 
that we want to live.61  The problem is that, in order to show that we must see ourselves as 
essentially human, Korsgaard defines human beings as reflective beings, or beings that face the 
normative question: ‘what should I be?’.  And it is not because we face that question that we are 
uncomfortable living in a society where assassination is commonplace.  We are opposed to 
assassination because we care about other people and desire security.  It is only by equivocating 
on ‘humanity’ and appealing to our intuitions about what a good human62 is like that Korsgaard 
can say a good human does not kill for cash.63 
Perhaps Korsgaard would say that, in killing someone, you prevent them from continuing 
to reflect.  And if you live in a society where assassination is commonplace, there is always the 
risk that your own reflective activities might be cut short.  Thus, the identity of assassin is 
inconsistent with valuing humanity after all.  But why should the reflective being care if its 
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reflective activities are cut short?  It is not clear why the reflective being must commit to 
continuing to reflect.  Certainly, there are some identities where, to embrace these identities now, 
we must commit to continuing to embrace these identities in the future.  To be a good parent 
now, you must commit to being there for your child in the future.  To be a good spouse now, you 
must commit to being there for your partner in the future.  Self-preservation (within reason) may 
be part of being a good parent or spouse, since a good parent or spouse does not want to abandon 
their child or partner.64  But there are other identities where this does not hold.  A good doctor 
takes care of the sick.  But a good doctor is not necessarily committed to remaining a doctor.  A 
doctor who hopes to retire someday is no worse a doctor here and now.65  So, if I must identify 
as a reflective being, I must be committed to reflecting here and now, but it is not clear that I 
must be committed to continuing to reflect.66 
Several paragraphs ago, I quoted Korsgaard’s claim that a practical identity is best 
understood as a description “under which [we] value [ourselves], … under which [we] find [our] 
life to be worth living and [our] actions to be worth undertaking.”  But we might wonder if this is 
true of the identity: ‘reflective being’.  Keep in mind that, for Korsgaard, the reflective being is 
the one who faces the problem of reflection.  But to say that we value ourselves as reflective 
beings is thus to say that we value facing this problem.  Certainly, if we must face the problem of 
reflection, and we must see the problem as a problem, then we must value the solution to the 
problem.  But that means that we must value being the kind of being that solves the problem of 
reflection, not that we must value the problem itself.67  We must value action and agency because 
action is the solution to our problem, and it is as agents that we act.  And so, we must take 
seriously the constitutive norms of action and agency.  But there is an ambiguity in the notion of 
agency here.  On the one hand, the agent / human (reflective) being is the one who faces the 
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problem of reflection, and on the other hand the agent / human (reflective) being is the one who 
temporarily solve the problem and acts.  But it is human being only in the latter sense that we 
must value.  The human being who solves the problem is never simply a reflective being.68  They 
are a reflective-doctor, reflective-student, reflective-teacher, etc.  So, if you value yourself as the 
reflective being who solves the problem, you do not value yourself simply as a human being, but 
as a particular individual with a particular practical identity.  The human being does not act; 
individuals do.69 
Korsgaard might say that, because we face the problem of reflection, we cannot simply 
endorse our desires, or the objects of our desires as valuable in themselves.  She claims that we 
do not treat our inclinations as reasons because we think that the objects of inclination are good 
in themselves.  Rather, “we take the objects of inclination to be good for us and we tend to take 
ourselves as good” and this is why we take objects of inclination to be good and worthy of 
choice.70  Thus, “every act of lawmaking [reflective choice to act on an inclination] expresses the 
value we place on ourselves.”71  And Korsgaard denies that this amounts to the metaphysical 
claim that if something is the condition of all value it must be taken to be valuable itself.72  But it 
is not clear how else we should understand this claim.  In “Valuing Our Humanity” Korsgaard 
argues that “what it means to value people is to confer value on the objects of their interests or 
choices” and “the fact that you confer value on the objects of your own interests, for no further 
reason than that they are your interests, shows that you do set a value on yourself.”73  This is why 
you must value your humanity.  But if valuing yourself amounts to no more than conferring 
value on the objects of your interests, then the problem of reflection collapses.  If valuing your 
humanity is equivalent to conferring value on the objects of your interests, then conferring value 
on the objects of your interests is always consistent with valuing your humanity.74   If that is 
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what it means to value your humanity, then it is hard to see what we human beings are forbidden 
to value or forbidden to do.  It is hard to see how valuing your humanity in that sense can help 
support a robust moral law. 
In order to say that action is possible, Korsgaard must deny that our reflective nature is 
always opposed to our animal nature.  Thus, the normative problem cannot be that we are forced 
back from our animal desires and must now derive our reasons from our reflective nature in 
order to act (the problem as Kerstein interprets Korsgaard).  But once she allows that our animal 
nature and reflective nature do not always conflict with one another, it is hard for Korsgaard to 
show that they ever conflict with one another.  She can say only that you must value what you 
value as a particular individual with a particular practical identity.  And this is a problem for 
Korsgaard if she wants to say that anything is forbidden to us as human (reflective) beings.  
Korsgaard may still be able to maintain that our answers to the question: ‘what do I have a 
reason to do?’ must take the form of a law for beings like us.  But all she can say about beings 
like us is that we are beings who face the problem of what to be, and that is not enough to 
support a robust moral law.  If we take the problem seriously, then we must value solving the 
problem.  But we do not have to value facing the problem in the first place.  It is only because 
Korsgaard equivocates between human beings as those who face the problem and human beings 
as those who solve the problem that she can say that we must value our humanity in order to act.  
The problem with Korsgaard’s account is not that it means no particular practical identities or 
actions can be justified (Kerstein’s worry), but rather that all (or almost all – see note 66) 
practical identities and actions can be justified.  This means that, far from being an irresolvable 
problem, Korsgaard’s normative problem is not even a real problem.  If essentially all practical 
identities and actions can serve as equally viable solutions to the normative problem, then the 
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problem disappears.75  The moral law, the law for all human (reflective) beings is: ‘essentially 
everything is permitted’.  Enoch is right to think that appealing to the constitutive standards of 
entities will not get us very far.  But a constitutivist who focuses instead on the constitutive 
standards of solutions to problems we already find ourselves facing can avoid Enoch’s criticism.   
And I do think that Korsgaard is right to think that we face a normative problem; that we need a 
viable solution to this problem (there are certain standards a solution must meet in order to count 
as a solution); and that this is a source of normativity (see page 5).  But the problem as described 
by Korsgaard is either trivial or impossible to solve.  So, if this kind of constitutivism is going to 
work, we need a better account of the normative problem. 
 
Section Three: Another Interpretation of the Normative Problem 
 
3.1 – When Do We Encounter the Normative Problem? 
 
 In this section I will argue that Korsgaard is right to say that we face a normative problem 
and the nature of the problem does determine what can count as a solution to the problem.  But I 
will argue that Korsgaard mischaracterizes the normative problem.  In the last section, I argued 
that the normative problem, as presented by Korsgaard, is either impossible to solve, or has a 
trivial solution.  Thus, if a constitutivist argument is going to work, we need a different account 
of the normative problem.  And, before we try to provide a different account of the problem, it 
might be helpful to first consider why Korsgaard’s account goes wrong.  I think that the reason 
Korsgaard’s account fails is because she does not adequately consider the conditions under 
which we face normative problems.  We do not usually find ourselves asking: ‘is this desire 
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really a reason to act?’ or ‘should I endorse this practical identity?’76  We are not always 
reflective beings.  Generally, we simply act on our desires and accept our particular practical 
identities without question.77  If we want to understand the kind of normative problems we face 
as reflective beings, we need to understand what it is that kicks off the process of reflection.  If 
we mostly just take our desires and identities to be reasonable, what is it that renders them 
problematic for us?  When and why do we face the normative problem? 
Korsgaard might insist that it does not matter that we do not always reflect on all of our 
desires and practical identities.  She could argue that there are constitutive rules of reflection and 
that, when we fail to reflect on our desires and particular practical identities, we are failing as 
reflective beings.  After all, she insists that the constitutive standards of reflection include the 
“rule that we should never stop reflecting until we have reached a satisfactory answer, one that 
admits of no further questioning.  It is the rule, in Kant’s language, that we should seek the 
unconditioned.”78  Korsgaard acknowledges that, according to her theory, a mafioso might have 
a reason to torture someone.79  But she insists that such a reason can never be as strong as their 
obligation not to.  Their reason to torture someone stems from a contingent practical identity 
which they can question.  But their obligation not to torture stems from their more basic identity 
as a human being.80  The mafioso’s “obligation to be a good person is therefore deeper than his 
obligation to stick to his code.”81  If the mafioso had reflected properly, he would have realized 
this, and realized that he needed to abandon his identity as a mafioso.   
However, Korsgaard can show that we must accept the identity ‘reflective being’ only if 
she defines a reflective being as a being who is confronted with the normative problem and if she 
shows that we face the normative problem (see the discussion above, pages 4-6).  So, it is not 
clear why the constitutive standards of reflection are normative for us insofar as we are not 
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confronted with the normative problem.  If Korsgaard wants to claim that the individual should 
accept the constitutive standards of reflection simply because they are capable of reflection, then 
her argument is vulnerable to Enoch’s critique.  Enoch would point out that we do not have a 
reason to reflect well unless we have a reason to reflect.  The constitutive standards of reflection 
are normative for us only if reflection is normative for us.  But the fact that we can reflect on 
does not support the claim that we should reflect.82  Keep in mind that Korsgaard can avoid 
Enoch’s criticisms only if she can show that we face a problem and “recognize [or would 
recognize] the problem” to be our own (see page 5).83  We must solve the problem of reflection 
only to the extent that we are confronted with the problem of reflection.  Perhaps Korsgaard can 
show that, when we face the normative problem, we must take the constitutive standards of the 
solution to this problem seriously.  But when we are not reflecting on a particular desire or 
practical identity, and have no reason to question that desire or practical identity (it is not 
inconsistent with any prior commitment of ours – see note 83), then we do not and would not 
recognize the problem to be our own or feel the need to solve the problem, and so have no reason 
to accept the constitutive standards of reflection. 
When do we encounter the normative problem?  When do we need to question our 
desires and particular practical identities?  When do we need to take the constitutive standards of 
reflection seriously and seek the unconditioned?  It might be argued that we encounter the 
problem as soon as the question: ‘is this desire a reason to act?’ occurs to us.84  But if that were 
true, and we could not act until we justified the desire, then someone could rob us of any reason 
for acting by simply asking us this question.  Nothing would be permitted to us as soon as the 
question occurred to us (see section 2.1).  More plausibly, even when we consider the question, it 
does not typically occur to us as a real problem because the answer is usually a trivial ‘yes’ (see 
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section 2.2).  In other words, even when we encounter the question, we do not usually encounter 
it as a problem.  We do not usually think it a question worth considering.  It is important to keep 
in mind that not all questions are problems.  You can understand a question without seeing it as a 
problem or feeling compelled to answer it.  A question only becomes a problem if we recognize 
(or would recognize) it as such and feel (or would feel) a need to solve it (see page 5 and note 
34).   
So, we do not always face the normative problem.  And we do not necessarily face the 
problem just because we realize that our desires and particular practical identities are contingent.  
If you are someone’s spouse, you might be aware that this identity is contingent without 
necessarily seeing this contingency as a problem or feeling compelled to justify your identity as 
their spouse.  Sometimes, however, we do find one of our desires or identities problematic, and 
we need an account of when and why this happens.  I would argue that this happens only when 
our desires and/or practical identities come into conflict with one another.  When our desires 
and/or practical identities conflict with one another, we find ourselves identifying with and also 
threatened by each.  Most of the time, we are not even fully aware of our desires or our practical 
identities.  But when two identities conflict with one another, we become aware of each of them 
as a threat to the other.  If two practical identities, A and B, come into conflict, then, as soon as 
we become aware of this conflict, we become aware of identity A as a problem for us as B and 
aware of identity B as a problem for us as A.  We can step back from identity A and perceive it 
as a threat from the perspective provided by identity B, and we can step back from identity B and 
perceive it as a threat from the perspective provided by identity A.  Imagine a doctor who works 
at a hospital into which their very ill spouse has just been admitted.  They may want to focus all 
their attention on their spouse but recognize that there are other patients in even greater, and 
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more urgent need of care.  They might begin to see their identity as a doctor as a threat to their 
identity as a spouse (a good doctor cares equally for all of their patients).  And they may begin to 
see their identity as a spouse as a threat to their integrity as a doctor (a good spouse cares for 
their partner in times of illness). 
 
3.2 – Unity as a Solution to the Normative Problem 
   
Most of the time, we are not so different from other animals.  Admittedly, many of our 
desires are the product of custom rather than instinct.  But, for human beings, custom serves 
much the same function that instinct serves for other animals.  So, it is not clear that this is an 
especially significant difference between human beings and ‘lower’ animals in our day to day 
mode of existence.  And Korsgaard has some interesting things to say about how animals exist in 
the world.  According to Korsgaard, pleasure and pain are best understood not as sensations but 
as “reflexive reactions to the things we experience.”  “Pleasure and pain are not so much the 
objects of experience, at least in the first instance, as a form of experience – they are the way we 
are conscious of our own conditions, which is a fundamentally valenced way.”85  Korsgaard 
points out that pleasure and pain cannot be sensations because the same sensation can be pleasant 
at one point, and painful the next.  Moreover, we call a number of different sensations painful or 
pleasant.86   What is it that makes us see all of the various painful sensations as painful and all of 
the various pleasant sensations as pleasant?  Korsgaard thinks that we classify our sensations in 
this way because to experience something as pleasant is to experience it as good-for-us and to 
experience something as painful is to experience it as bad-for-us.  Thus, Korsgaard says that 
when an animal feels pleasure or pain, they are perceiving a reason to preserve or to change their 
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condition.  But Korsgaard insists that pain is only the unreflective rejection of a threat to your 
identity,87 whereas obligation is the “reflective rejection of a threat to your identity.”88  Because 
we human beings are capable of reflection, Korsgaard believes that human beings are subject to 
obligation.  For animals, the objects of their desires are ‘reasons’ for ‘acting’, but for us the 
objects of our desires are only candidates for reasons. 
Of course, pleasure and pain are terms we usually reserve for physical sensations or, on 
Korsgaard’s account, for things which are good-for or bad-for our actual body.  But there is more 
to our identity than our physical body.89  According to Korsgaard, if I identify with something, I 
take myself to have a reason to preserve it, and Korsgaard calls this identification “sympathy.”  
She argues that sympathy involves seeing the world from the perspective of some functional 
system: seeing that which is good-for that system as good and that which is bad-for that system 
as bad.  Thus, she says that, “when you judge something is good, the function of the judgment is 
not descriptive, but sympathetic – at the limit, sympathy with yourself.”90   
However, we can and do identify with various different functional systems,91 but we do 
not have to identify with any of them.  Korsgaard believes that we, unlike other animals, can and 
must question our contingent identities and so must always ask: ‘can I endorse this identity?’.  
And because the I is singular, because we must see ourselves as a unified self who asks this 
question and needs an answer, we must test the contingent identity against our necessary identity 
as a human (reflective) being (the one who asks the question and needs an answer).  We must 
test the particular identity against the moral law.  This is not to say that our contingent identities 
are not important.  Korsgaard argues that the agent must conform to the dictates of reason (the 
constitutive standards of reflective being), but this is not because they simply identify with 
reason (reflective being), “but rather because [they] identifies with [their] constitution, and it 
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says that reason should rule.”92  She insists that reason must rule on behalf of the whole.93  So 
Korsgaard believes that we must take our contingent identities and desires seriously.94  But 
ultimately it is only by testing our incentives against the moral law that we determine if they can 
be reasons for acting.95   
Thus, for Korsgaard, we are creatures who must always step back from, and call into 
question, our contingent desires and practical identities.  This is the source of the normative 
problem.  And the solution to the problem is to appeal to our most basic practical identity 
(reflective being) and use this as a standard according to which we can test our desires and our 
other practical identities.  But, as I argued in section two, the practical identity of ‘reflective 
being’ is a standard without any substance.  Moreover, it is hard to imagine what other practical 
identity could serve as the basic standard against which we could test our desires and lesser 
practical identities.  In fact, it is not at all clear that there is any sort of fixed hierarchy of desires 
and identities.  If we encounter the normative problem only in cases of conflict between our 
contingent desires or between our contingent practical identities, then the problem is not one 
where we simply step back from our desires and judge them according to our practical identity, 
or step back from a contingent practical identity and judge it from the perspective of a necessary 
practical identity.96  Instead, the problem is one of balancing our various desires and practical 
identities against one another.  Korsgaard offers us a “‘testing’ rather than a ‘weighing’ model of 
reasons.”97  However, without a substantive moral law against which to test our contingent 
identities and desires, this is not a plausible model of practical reason. 
 I do agree with Korsgaard that the task of practical reason is to make us into unified 
agents.  And I find Korsgaard’s account of pleasure, pain, and sympathy compelling.  But I think 
that we encounter the normative problem when we sympathize with multiple, competing 
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functional systems.   I would argue that the normative problem is a problem of responding to the 
various claims these competing functional systems make on us, where we must weigh  
each claim against the others.98  After all, if the problem is something like: ‘what should I do / 
who should I be here and now, given that I am called to respond to these conflicting claims?’, 
then the nature of the problem actually determines the form the answer must take and, to some 
extent, the content it must have.  It must take the form of a rule that can respond to all of these 
conflicting claims.99  So perhaps we can understand humanity, or reflective being, in terms of 
being-confronted-with-a-problem-of-unification where this involves integrating our various 
identities into a coherent whole.100  Our problem is that we must answer the normative question: 
‘what do I have a reason to do?’ But we must answer this question only when it is not (or would 
not be)101 obvious to us what we have a reason to do.102  In other words, we find ourselves facing 
the normative problem only when we find ourselves needing to respond to conflicting claims.  
And the fact that this problem is one of conflicting claims sets limitations on what counts as an 
appropriate response.  A response that fails to satisfy any of the claims would fail as a response, 
a response that satisfies the more important claim(s) would be better, and a response that satisfies 




In this MRP I hope to have shown that, if constitutivism is to work, it cannot focus on the 
constitutive standards of certain kinds of entities or behaviors.  Enoch is right to reject that kind 
of constitutivism.  Constitutivists must instead consider the constitutive standards of solutions to 
problems we already find ourselves facing.   In the first section of my paper, I argued that 
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Korsgaard is best read as claiming that we human beings face a normative problem, we need a 
solution to that problem, and so must recognize the constitutive standards of such a solution.  
Specifically, we face the problem of what to do and who to be.  And Korsgaard thinks that the 
solution to that problem is agency, where agency entails valuing humanity (respecting the moral 
law).  In the second section, however, I argued that the normative problem, as presented by 
Korsgaard, is either impossible to solve (if Kerstein’s interpretation of the problem is correct) or 
has a trivial solution (if my interpretation of the problem is correct).  Thus, we must reject 
Korsgaard’s account of the normative problem and her attempts to ground a robust moral law on 
the constitutive standards of agency.  If constitutivism is to work, we need a different account of 
the problem.  In the third section, I showed that the reason Korsgaard’s account of the problem 
fails is because she does not adequately consider the conditions under which we face normative 
problems.  We do not usually face the normative problem in our day to day lives.  Instead, we 
mostly act according to instinct, habit, and custom.  I then suggested an alternative account of the 
normative problem where we are confronted with the problem whenever we find ourselves 
facing competing claims and/or torn between competing identities.  Moreover, there are certain 
standards a solution to this kind of problem must meet in order to count as a viable solution.  A 
response that fails to satisfy any of the competing claims would fail as a response; a response 
that satisfies the more important claim(s) would be better; and a response that satisfies all of the 
relevant claims is best.  But there is no reason to believe that the solution to this kind of 
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1 Korsgaard herself does not make this distinction and appears to use ‘human (reflective) being’ and ‘agent’ 
interchangeably.  But this distinction will be important for the argument in section 2.2 (see page 15).   
2 And, for the purpose of this argument, custom serves the same function as instinct.  Insofar as we act under the 
authority of custom, we do not need to ask: ‘what should I do?’ or ‘who should I be?’. 
3 Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency, 8. 
4 And, of course, there are constitutive standards to being an assassin as well.  But the assassin’s victim might prefer 
that their would-be assassin falls short of those standards. 
5 This argument is introduced in The Sources of Normativity (see especially Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 
121-3, 236, and 257-8).  It is also the main focus of The Constitution of Agency and Self-Constitution: Agency, 
Identity, and Integrity. 
6 Keeping in mind that the reflective being / agent distinction is my distinction, not Korsgaard’s (see note 1). 
7 Enoch is hardly alone in interpreting Korsgaard in this way.  For other authors who interpret Korsgaard this way 
see: Bratu and Dittmeyer, “Constitutivism About Practical Principles,” 1132; Tubert, “Constitutive Arguments,” 
656-666; and Okrent, “Heidegger and Korsgaard on Human Reflection” (especially page 63 – but see note 20 for 
Okrent’s reading of the argument).  William FitzPatrick might also read her this way (see FitzPatrick, “The Practical 
Turn in Ethical Theory,” 671-3 – but see note 20 on FitzPatrick’s reading of the argument). 
8 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 1. 
9 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 2. 
10 David Enoch, “Agency Shmagency,” 189. 
11 Not should not quit but somehow cannot. 
12 Where this is a descriptive ‘must’ rather than a normative ‘must’.  For whatever reason, we have no other option.   
13 Enoch, “Agency Shmagency,” 188-9. 
14 Where this is also a descriptive ‘must’.   
15 Enoch, “Agency Shmagency,” 188. 
16 Other critics also think that Korsgaard faces a problem with this question.  See for instance Bratu and Dittmeyer, 





and the Foundations of Ethics, 102-3 (although Katsafanas is himself a constitutivist, he thinks that Enoch’s 
criticism of constitutivism in general works against Korsgaard’s brand of constitutivism).  Allan Gibbard may also 
be making a similar point when he talks about seeing reflective choice as a “burden” (Gibbard, “Morality as 
Consistency,” 154).  See also Tubert, “Constitutive Arguments,” 663-664 for a discussion of this question. 
17 Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 93. 
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incompatible (see also note 96).  But at other times our inability to respond to all of the claims on us is the stuff of 
tragedy.  
